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What, if any, ethical issues arise in the practice of economics? Should 
advice on handling any such issues be encoded by organisations of 
economists, and if so how? 
The financial crisis of 2008 is the immediate prompt for these 
questions. However, DeMartino’s concerns extend beyond those 
addressed in works aimed at the general public, most dramatically       
in the film Inside Job. Namely that if prominent economists produce 
expensive reports certifying the health of banking institutions, and if 
those institutions then promptly collapse in a welter of debt, one has to 
doubt either their insight or their probity. 
But even in a world in which all economists were not only perfectly 
honest but also masters of the knowledge that they profess, economists 
could still behave unethically in the sense that interests DeMartino.  
Even if economics is thought to be a science—and thus ‘true’ in the 
sense in which physics might be said to be true—it implies (social) 
engineering, in other words action that is immediately directed at 
affecting human functioning and thus potentially compromising 
autonomous agency. Moreover, this is an implication that few 
economists, of any persuasion, have been reluctant to draw. Whether  
the economist believes that perfectly competitive markets constitute the 
beneficent natural order of the world and the actual ills of the world 
result from the machinations of monopolists, or whether she believes 
that markets are inherently prone to generating instability and 
inequality, practical policy measures are implied. Few indeed, according 
to DeMartino, are the economists who have shrunk from top-down 
implementation of those measures, no matter how drastic the short-
term implications for the human populations affected. 
Thus the central concern of this book is the fact that economics has 
public consequences. If there are private (or, better, individual) ethical 
issues when (say) the economist faces pressure to produce work which 
THE ECONOMIST’S OATH / BOOK REVIEW 
VOLUME 4, ISSUE 2, AUTUMN 2011 90 
lends intellectual support to policies decided in advance of the evidence 
that is supposed to justify them, that is a second-order issue. The really 
important problems arise when honest policy-makers are policy-
enforcers. 
Whether one considers the dismantling of financial regulation that 
allegedly created the conditions for the crisis of 2008; the foisting of  
the Washington Consensus on developing economies; ‘shock therapy’ in 
post-1989 transition economies; or the ‘economics of control’—which 
DeMartino, following Colander (2005), identifies with the post-World 
War II mainstream—economists have advocated and helped to 
implement measures that created winners and losers, at least in          
the short term. In many cases these policies were not clearly supported 
by the populations affected, and in some cases economists advocated 
quick action precisely to forestall any political mobilisation against 
them. Jeffrey Sachs, for example, said that his advice to officials in post-
1989 Eastern European economies was to “figure out how much society 
can take, and then move three times quicker than that” (Sachs 1991, 
cited on p. 9). 
In thus operating on conscious individuals who have their own views 
on the nature of the problems that they face, and on what remedies  
may be acceptable, economics does not resemble engineering, but 
medicine—a profession which has the oldest formal ethical code, and 
whose first principle is well-known even among non-professionals: 
‘First, do no harm’. This insight is, literally, at the centre of DeMartino’s 
work: “Those who occupy positions in which they can […] significantly 
alter the life chances of others necessarily traverse dense ethical 
thickets”, he points out on the penultimate page of Part I of his two-part 
book (p. 116). 
In Part I DeMartino makes his case for professional economic ethics, 
which he takes to be conclusive. Part II is devoted to considering what 
such an ethical code might contain, a discussion which he is careful to 
specify is not conclusive, but intended to found a program of research 
and debate. In fact DeMartino looks forward to a new academic field 
treating the ethics of economics. 
Part I begins by setting the scene, with chapter 1 concluding with the 
insistence that the destination—ethics—must not be conflated with       
a code of conduct: “Professional ethics involves intellectual and 
pedagogical practices and traditions, not a list of rules that can be 
tacked to the cubicle wall” (p. 14). 
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The next two chapters take us through the varied settings in which 
the applied economist may work, and the kinds of ethical challenge that 
may face her in such situations. 
The fourth chapter demonstrates both that DeMartino’s concerns are 
far from novel and that a reluctance to deal with them is rooted in 
American progressivism’s conflicting commitments to social reform and 
to objective scientific practice, a conflict played out in the early history 
of the American Economic Association, where the latter commitment 
had won a decisive victory by 1920. One might think that commitment 
to (supposedly) objective science would conduce to a concern            
with professional standards, but of course the substantive content of 
mainstream economics includes reasons to be sceptical of professional 
claims to self-regulation, on the grounds that well-intentioned or not the 
effect is to establish a cartel. 
Thus chapter 5 explores the grounds on which economics has 
resisted self-development as a profession on the lines of medicine. 
Though DeMartino does not put it quite like this, one might say         
that economics has not disdained designation as a profession, but has 
declined the responsibilities that professional status entails. This, he 
asserts, is due to the fact that neoclassical economics is committed to a 
consequentialist approach to the evaluation of action: only the outcome 
is relevant, never the intention. This has the disturbing implication that 
a value-free science might licence behaviour that is value-free in a 
different sense—that lying, cheating, and stealing might be condoned    
if they lead to the best outcome for society (in the judgement of the 
scientist). 
At this point, DeMartino is ready to set out his own arguments. 
Chapter 6 is negative, in that it rebuts the economic case against 
economic ethics. In the first place, if one renounces ambitions for a  
code of conduct, one allays suspicion of the sanctions that would         
be necessary to police such a code (such as a licensing body). To the 
average economist, following in the steps of Adam Smith, such 
sanctions look like thinly-veiled contrivances to protect economists 
from market forces, rather than to protect the public from economists—
an outcome which would indeed be ironic.  
The foregoing is an important practical point. Intellectually          
(but hence also practically) more interesting is the way in which 
DeMartino turns the claim of ethical neutrality against itself. Economists 
may claim to be ‘only’ advising, and that therefore they are absolved 
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from two central ethical problems, that of compromising the autonomy 
of the advisee, and of responsibility for the consequences of their advice 
(since the advisee is free to take it or leave it, the responsibility lies with 
them). But this will not do. The possession of expertise inevitably gives 
the advisor causal influence over the decision, through choices about 
the weighting of arguments and their framing, and about the options 
outlined (the last especially important in the light of ‘unambiguous’ 
evidence that the inclusion of irrelevant options can affect choice). 
The following chapter moves on to the positive case for professional 
economic ethics, beginning with establishing that economics is indeed a 
profession on the grounds that it involves use of abstract knowledge, 
has social significance, claims expertise, and that its practitioners  
(when practising) claim to be and are recognised as governed by       
role-specific norms rather than general norms of human conduct. 
(DeMartino adds a fifth ground; that most economists are employed     
in bureaucratic institutions This seems thin: while little is known    
about Hippocrates—and even the eponymous oath may post-date his 
life—it seems clear that he was never an employee of anything 
resembling (say) the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As we shall see, it also 
appears to lead DeMartino into circular reasoning.) 
The core of DeMartino’s argument is the following claim: 
‘economists enjoy authority and exert influence over others by virtue of 
the intellectual monopoly they hold over a body of knowledge that is 
vital to social welfare’ (see p. 106). Thus even (perhaps especially?)         
a strict consequentialist ought to recognise at least one ethical principle: 
‘First, do no harm’. But if one accepts that individual autonomy is a 
basic value (and mainstream economists, with their doctrine of 
consumer sovereignty, should be the last to find this problematic)      
the exercise of expertise puts the economist in the position of balancing 
harms: on the one hand the inevitable harm to one’s advisee’s 
autonomy, and on the other hand outcomes that are sub-optimal         
(in other respects) that may result from trying to avoid compromising 
autonomy. (If a doctor fears that fully-explaining a known effective 
treatment may lead the patient to reject it, should she give the 
explanation?) 
DeMartino builds what he calls an ‘escalating case’, in that while this 
first argument for ethics is meant to be conclusive, it is strengthened by 
its three successors. Firstly, the modern economics profession enjoys 
institutionalised power: whether through devising structures for 
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economic exchange or directly disbursing resources, economists govern. 
Secondly, economic interventions affect different groups differently; 
even policies believed to benefit all in the long-run are likely to produce 
short-term losers. One might think that this fact already directly posed 
ethical dilemmas but, DeMartino notes, economists rarely hesitate    
even where compensation for the losers is unlikely. Finally there is the 
question of uncertainty. Even if our theoretical knowledge was perfect, 
our factual knowledge cannot be. Yet on many (maybe all) issues, 
economists disagree profoundly about how we should understand the 
world. Thus error and unintended consequences are unavoidable, as are 
the ethical issues attached to acting in such circumstances. 
This last point is the basis of a serious charge in Part 2, when 
DeMartino moves on to consider what things, or what sorts of things,    
a code of ethics for economics might include. For radical uncertainty 
requires some prudential principle (for which ‘first do no harm’ is      
not necessarily the only candidate). But in a variety of episodes (the 
Washington Consensus, transition economies, financial deregulation) 
economics chose exactly the opposite principle, that of maxi-max: of all 
possible alternatives, choose the one whose best possible outcome        
is better than the best outcomes of the alternatives regardless of the 
probability of its coming about. 
This may lead, in DeMartino’s words, to an attitude that is “hubristic 
and ideological rather than humble and pragmatic” (p. 151), but is it 
unethical? Yes, because it obviously violates the prudential principle, 
but also because it leads to violation of the principle of autonomy: the 
need to respect the agency, integrity and self-governance of those       
the professional seeks to assist. In particular, it ignores the principle of 
prior informed consent which other professions, such as medicine, have 
arrived at. 
As mentioned, the second half of the work sketches out a variety of 
issues that might inform DeMartino’s projected discipline of economic 
ethics. 
The first is what might be learned from the experience of other 
professions (chapter 8). The prudential principle and prior informed 
consent have already been mentioned, and the latter leads directly to 
the next issue considered by DeMartino, that of ‘dirty hands’: can it ever 
be justifiable to do wrong with a view to doing right? 
Then there is the problem of ‘many hands’: organizations may do 
wrong even though all their members appear to be acting impeccably 
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when judged by professional norms and/or their institutional role. 
Since, as a matter of empirical fact, many economists are employed by 
large organizations what one might call the ethics of bureaucracy must 
inform the ethics of professional economics. However, recall that this 
fact about employment is one of the reasons DeMartino gives for 
considering economics to be a profession in the first place. Hence there 
seems to be a problem of circularity: work in bureaucracies creates 
ethical problems for economists because they are professionals, and 
they are professionals because they work in bureaucracies. Does the 
same argument apply to janitors? (Janitors in evil organizations face 
ethical problems, but that does not mean that they are professionals in 
DeMartino’s sense.) 
Also relevant here, of course, are the second-order issues mentioned 
at the beginning of this review, namely conflicts of interest and 
corruption, but these are not confined to economists (or, indeed,          
to professionals). However, as DeMartino points out in chapter 11, 
economics cannot import wholesale the lessons learned in other fields. 
One area where economics will have to find its own way, he 
suggests, is econometrics (a brief but pertinent literature review            
is provided). This seems to be right, but while DeMartino goes on to 
provide a useful discussion of the issues involved in the growing field  
of experimental economics I could not find anything that seemed 
unique to economics, as opposed to medical research, say. 
More convincing, as an argument for the distinctiveness of economic 
ethics, is the discussion of economic democracy (following on from the 
principle of informed consent) and hence the ethical imperative to 
promote the capacity of communities that find themselves the object   
of economic policy prescriptions—the capacity, that is, to discuss and 
(presumably) reject the economist’s proposals if they choose. 
Finally, and especially to be applauded, there is a call for intellectual 
pluralism. DeMartino usefully notes that this is an obligation on the 
profession as a whole, but the extent to which, or in what way, this is  
an obligation on individual economists is a different question. 
Both in construction and exposition the book displays the 
carefulness and clarity that characterises the best philosophical writing. 
DeMartino works through his arguments thoroughly but concisely,     
not shrinking from exploring the ramifications of his points, but not 
pursuing them further than is needed to grasp the issues in question. 
The care and clarity of his writing should make it impossible for a 
THE ECONOMIST’S OATH / BOOK REVIEW 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 95 
careful, honest reader to misinterpret what the author is arguing.   
Hence he provides a fruitful basis for the further debate that he calls 
for, whether or not one is persuaded by his particular case (although 
this reviewer is persuaded). 
Since initiation of a field of enquiry is the circumspect ambition of 
the author, it is unfair to complain about alleged omissions, so instead   
I offer some suggestions for enquiry. 
Firstly, DeMartino rightly says that an ethical economics should be a 
pluralist economics, where schools of thought are assessed by what they 
may be able to contribute to our understanding, rather than dismissed  
a priori because of theoretical commitments. But one might want to 
consider what if any commitments are ruled out on ethical grounds—an 
issue that DeMartino himself raises implicitly in his rejection of the 
‘economics of control’ and of the maxi-max principle. 
Secondly and relatedly, chapter 12 provides a discussion of what 
might be involved in training ethical economists. But this is essentially  
a pragmatic programme (‘how to train ethical economists?’). Thus, 
surprisingly, it appears to justify such training on consequentialist 
grounds (‘if we do not do this, the result will be unethical practice’).   
But one might also consider the ethical case for ethical training, namely 
that in failing to alert our students not only to pluralist economics,    
but to economic ethics, we are failing to develop their autonomy and 
capacity for self-governance. 
Finally, DeMartino’s discussion is almost wholly concerned with    
the state of U. S. economics. This is perfectly sensible given the latter’s 
leading role in the profession, but it would be a great shame if           
this hindered DeMartino’s reception by those whose background        
and situation is different. The book begins and ends with a vision of 
future commencement ceremonies at which new economists raise their 
hands and recite in unison the economist’s oath. In cultures where 
graduation has more the overtones of conclusion than commencement, 
this may seem strange. In ones where school children do not begin their 
day in class with a recital of the “Pledge of Allegiance”, it may seem 
cloying or even rebarbative. 
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